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Abstract:  The original institutional theory of institutional change as elaborated by Paul D. Bush (1987) in the 
traditions of Veblen, Ayres and J.F. Foster (VAFB-paradigm in the following) provides a most important 
theoretical device for critical institutional analysis, with its clarification of the value base and of different forms 
and dynamics of value-behavior patterns. Bush’s paper certainly was one of the most important ones in the 
history of Institutionalism. The Theory of Institutional Change pushed Institutionalism to a certain limit by 
elaborating its logical relations that have been underexplored for so long. Coming from a different ‘galaxy’, 
established formal approaches and methods, such as system dynamics, econometrics, network analysis, graph 
theory, or game theory (GT)—in fact, often applied only bluntly in the economics ‘mainstream’—have been 
interpreted, developed and applied by institutional and evolutionary economists in an evolutionary-institutional 
perspective in the last two decades. However, a theoretical and methodological gap still existed until recently 
that institutionalists working with those formal approaches had to deal with. This gap seems to get closed 
recently by different approaches such as with the Social Fabric Matrix Approach (F.G. Hayden et al.) and 
System Dynamics (M.J. Radzicki et al.), both developed to operationalize, formalize, empirically apply and 
further process and develop institutionalist theory. This paper strives to demonstrate that a careful proper 
interpretation allows, in a ‘dialectical’ process, to bridge the remaining gap between the institutionalist theory of 
institutional change and an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of GT. This attempt reveals surprising 
equivalences and complementarities with resulting potential synergies for the future. The mutual approximation 
of the VAFB-paradigm and evolutionary-institutionally interpreted game theory, called the EIGT-paradigm in 
the following, allows for (1) a deeper logical analysis of institutions, (2) revealing the value base in EIGT, (3) a 
deeper analysis of the instrumental-ceremonial asymmetry, (4) a sharpening of the understanding of ceremonial 
dominance and encapsulation, and (5) a readjustment of the institutionalist policy conception. Should such 
bridge-building be corroborated in the future, Institutionalism would be enabled to cut across traditional 
boundaries with respect to deeper both empirical and logical analysis. This might turn out to be a broader 
historical project for the extension of Institutionalism’s reach. 
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System Dynamics (M.J. Radzicki et al.), both developed to operationalize, formalize, empirically apply and 
further process and develop institutionalist theory. This paper strives to demonstrate that a careful proper 
interpretation allows, in a ‘dialectical’ process, to bridge the remaining gap between the institutionalist theory of 
institutional change and an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of GT. This attempt reveals surprising 
equivalences and complementarities with resulting potential synergies and cross-fertilization for the future. The 
mutual approximation of the VAFB-paradigm and evolutionary-institutionally interpreted game theory, called 
the EIGT-paradigm in the following, allows for (1) a deeper logical analysis of institutions, (2) revealing the 
value base in EIGT, (3) a deeper analysis of the instrumental-ceremonial asymmetry, (4) a sharpening of the 
understanding of ceremonial dominance and encapsulation, and (5) a readjustment of the institutionalist policy 
conception. Should such bridge-building be corroborated in the future, Institutionalism would be enabled to cut 
across traditional boundaries with respect to deeper both empirical and logical analysis. This might turn out to 
be a broader historical project for the extension of Institutionalism’s reach. 
 
 
The conceptualization of institutions, the asymmetric schematization of value-behavior-structures, the reason for 
ceremonial dominance, and the possibility of progressive institutional change will be reconsidered and compared 
in this paper using a EIGT perspective, with its basically instrumental comprehension of institutions and with the 
ceremonial warrant comprehensible only as a degeneration of the instrumental. We refer to a most simple social 
dilemma interaction structure and a supergame solution. 
An initially instrumental institution is considered to develop (in fact to degenerate), together with (1) the 
emergence, or reproduction, of status and power differentials in hierarchical systems, and (2) the striving for 
easy, smooth, and cheap decision-making, or ‘economies of scale’ of decision-making, first into a still 
instrumental norm and eventually into a ceremonial or abstract norm. The latter takes place, when original 
conditions have changed but the institutional structure will not properly adapt because of the two motives 
mentioned of status gain and economies of scale of institutionalized decision-making. In a game-theoretical 
perspective, ceremonial dominance and ceremonial encapsulation preventing a new progressive institutional 
change would translate into an insufficient new collective action capacity, due to (1) habituation, (2) an 
insufficient incentive structure and (3) a neglect of the common future. 
The conclusion of the critical role of policy to initiate, accelerate, and stabilize progressive institutional change 
is shared in the institutionalist and the EIGT perspectives as well. A well-defined institutional policy approach, 
inferable in some detail from the GT logic, may initiate a lock-out from ceremonial encapsulation, through a 
change of the incentive structure, and an increase in the importance and awareness of interdependence and the 
common future. The public agent must be capable of ‘meritorizing’ the private-interaction outcomes through a 
negotiated, participatory social process. Thus, the public agent would interact with the interaction system of the 
private agents in a well-defined way, i.e., ‘institutional policy’ as a double interactive policy. 
 3 
Introduction 
 
The dynamics of social institutions between ‘instrumental’ and ‘ceremonial’ warrant is an 
original-institutionalist core theme and an empirically most relevant issue for modern socio-
economic research. Thorstein Veblen and two of his finest exponents, Clarence E. Ayres and 
his student, J. Fagg Foster, explored the dynamics of institutions between the instrumental and 
ceremonial. The evolutionary-institutionalist ‘state of the art’ that had emerged this way was 
reviewed and clearly restated by Foster’s students Marc R. Tool and Paul D. Bush, and further 
developed into a theoretical scheme of institutional forms and dynamics by P.D. Bush during 
the 1970s and 1980s. The model that culminated in the Theory of Institutional Change (Bush 
1987) had a great impact on institutionalist thinking on the process and variants of 
institutional change – and still has a great potential for modern evolutionary-institutional 
economics in general (see, e.g., Waller 1982, 1987; O’Hara 1997; O’Hara, Tool 1998; 
Fayazmanesh, Tool (eds.) 1998). The original institutional theory of institutional change 
(also, after Veblen, Ayres, Foster and Bush, called VAFB-paradigm in the following) 
provided a most important theoretical device for critical institutional analysis through its 
clarification of the value base and of different forms and dynamics of value-behavior patterns. 
Thus, Bush’s paper certainly was one of the most important in the history of Institutionalism. 
It pushed Institutionalism to a certain limit by elaborating its logical relations that still had 
been underexplored then. This paper will strive to demonstrate its ongoing great potential and 
prime recent relevance through a major reconsideration and revisiting in an even more formal 
perspective1. 
 
Coming from a different ‘galaxy’, established formal approaches and methods, such as 
system dynamics, econometrics, network analysis, graph theory, or game theory—in fact, 
often applied only bluntly in the economics ‘mainstream’—have been interpreted, developed 
and applied by institutional and evolutionary economists in an evolutionary-institutional 
perspective in the last two to three decades (for the Social Fabric Matrix Approach, and 
applied graph theory and matrix theory, see, e.g., Hayden 2006, particularly Chpt. 6; 
Natarajan, Elsner, Fullwiler (eds.) 2009; Markwell 2009; for system dynamics, see, e.g., 
Radzicki 1988, 2009; for game theory, see, e.g., Hargreaves Heap, Varoufakis 2004, 
particularly Chpts. 5, 6; Field 1994, 2001; Villena, Villena 2004). However, a conceptual, 
theoretical and methodological gap still existed until recently that institutionalists who were 
working with those formal approaches had to deal with. This gap seems to get closed recently 
in the context of different approaches such as with the Social Fabric Matrix Approach (F.G. 
Hayden et al.) and Game Theory (GT, and particularly Evolutionary Game Theory, EGT; see, 
e.g., Villena, Villena 2004; Elsner, Heinrich 2009; Elsner 2010; Hédoin 2010; Watkins 2010), 
both developed to operationalize, formalize, empirically apply and further process and 
develop institutionalist theory. 
 
This paper strives to demonstrate that a careful proper interpretation allows, in a ‘dialectical’ 
process, to bridge the remaining gaps, in our case, between the institutionalist theory of 
institutional change and an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of GT (also EIGT-
paradigm in the following)2. This attempt reveals surprising equivalences and 
                                                 
1
 To our knowledge, O’Hara 1997 was the only earlier attempt at further analyzing the logic of the institutionalist 
theory of institutional change and applying it (to economic systems). See also O’Hara, Tool 1998, 16-18, for a 
further logical clarification in terms of axiomatization and the derivation of a system of theorems from it. This 
paper considers itself in that tradition. 
2
 The first attempt, to our knowledge, at explicitly approaching Evolutionary Game Theory and Institutionalism 
was Villena, Villena 2004. Recently, Hédoin 2010, 975-84, and Watkins 2010, 1005f., both arguing within the 
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complementarities with resulting potential synergies and cross-fertilization for the future. The 
mutual approximation of the VAFB and EIGT paradigms will allow for (1) a deeper logical 
analysis of institutions, (2) revealing the value base in EIGT, (3) a deeper analysis of the 
instrumental-ceremonial asymmetry, (4) a sharpening of the understanding of ceremonial 
dominance and encapsulation, and (5) a readjustment of the institutionalist policy conception. 
 
Should such bridge-building be corroborated in the future, Institutionalism would be enabled 
to cut across traditional boundaries with respect to deeper theoretical, logical, and empirical 
analyses. Therefore, this might turn out to be a broader historical project for the extension of 
Institutionalism’s reach. 
 
To recapitulate, characteristic of the institutionalist theory of institutional change (Bush 1987) 
are 
 
1. the conception of an institution as a value-behavior-structure, i.e., patterns of 
behaviors correlated by values; 
 
2. the instrumental, ceremonial, and ‘dialectical’ significance of such correlated 
patterns of behavior; 
 
3. the asymmetric logic and asymmetric operational principles of instrumental and 
ceremonial valuation; 
 
4. a scheme of specific value-behavior-structures resulting from those different 
significances of behaviors and from that value asymmetry; 
 
5. the conception of degrees of ceremonial dominance in (or its reverse, the 
‘instrumental permissiveness’ of) a system’s institutional structure, as derived 
from that asymmetry; 
 
6. the definition of a partitioned institutional space, where typically a real-world 
institutional structure (or an economic system) is in the state of ceremonial 
encapsulation; 
 
7. resulting forms of institutional change, i.e., changes of the degree of ceremonial 
dominance, where typically there will be either an ongoing (enforced) ceremonial 
encapsulation (staying in the same sector of the institutional space, i.e., no change 
of degree), or regressive or progressive institutional change (increasing or 
decreasing degrees of ceremonial dominance); 
 
8. the consideration that progressive institutional change will not automatically occur 
but will require discretionary public-policy support, possible only in a pragmatist 
culture of a participatory and negotiated democratic process. 
 
The EIGT perspective on institutions, on the other hand, is different, at first sight, beginning 
with the fact that institutions can be explained only in an instrumental sense, i.e., as a solution 
                                                                                                                                                        
general conception of evolution, have suggested and applied a similar perspective and approach. We have not 
included their insights into our approach yet. But a first review confirms that our approach definitely has come to 
be ‘in the air’ within recent Institutionalism. The present paper is definitely toeing the line with those papers. 
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of a complex decision problem, typically a social dilemma structure. This also illustrates that 
the perspective is one of institutional emergence. 
 
Nevertheless, surprising similarities, equivalences, and complementarities between both 
perspectives turn out to exist so that not only a comparison and mutual ‘translation’, but also 
considerable future cross-fertilization appear feasible. For instance, while the game-theoretic 
perspective may benefit, in terms of a broader perspective and epistemological sensitivity, 
from the value sensitivity of institutionalism, the institutionalist analysis, in turn, may profit 
from some deeper logical analysis feasible through a game-theoretic conceptualization, e.g., a 
more specific explanation of the emergence of the ceremonial and of a policy design. We will 
show this in more detail in the following. 
 
This paper aims at 
 
1. illustrating the GT perspective on institutions with a most simple game-theoretic 
formalism; 
 
2. comparing and ‘translating’ back and forth the two conceptions of institutions, of 
the asymmetry of the two value systems, and of ceremonial dominance; 
 
3. complementing a simple explanation from the GT perspective of why ceremonial 
values emerge (and then dominate) at all, out of an ideal instrumental world; 
 
4. demonstrating that institutionalist and EIGT perspectives share the policy 
conclusion that discretionary policy support is required to initiate, accelerate, and 
stabilize progressive institutional change, and that the GT-inspired conception of 
interactive/institutional policy may add some specific policy instruments. 
 
In the first section, we explain and compare the two conceptions of institutions. Section 2 
discusses institutions as value-behavior structures and introduces the ‘ceremonial’ and the 
‘instrumental’ valuations. The third section analyzes the asymmetry of this value structure, 
resulting asymmetric institutional structures, and in particular ceremonial dominance, each in 
both perspectives. Section 4 explains the process and forms of institutional change, 
particularly ceremonial encapsulation, and regressive/progressive institutional change. Section 
5 explains the emergence of the ceremonial as a degeneration of the instrumental in a EIGT 
perspective. Section 6 introduces and discusses the converging policy implications in both 
perspectives. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
1) The Two Conceptions of an ‘Institution’ Compared 
 
 
1.1) A Most Simple GT Formalism to Determine an ‘Instrumental’ Definition – and Its 
Ceremonial Downside 
 
The simplest formal illustration of the GT institutional perspective is the static ‘single-shot’ 
solution of a prisoners’ dilemma (PD). We have explained and elaborated at length elsewhere 
on the practical everyday relevance of the PD structure, the full evolutionary ‘process story’ 
required for substantial explanation, a formal model of emergence (most effectively at certain 
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‘meso’ ‘platform’ sizes), and computer simulations of some core elements of that model (see, 
e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2009, 2011). 
 
The ‘single-shot’ just provides a logical condition for the superiority of cooperation, solving 
the dilemma problem, over defection. Assume a simple PD 2x2 normal-form matrix: 
 
a, a d, b 
b, d c, c 
 
with b > a > c > d, and a > (d + b)/2. As is well-known, the payoffs P in a ‘supergame’ (SG)3 
for the cooperative tit-for-tat (TFT)4 player always encountering another TFT player, and for a 
defection (ALL D) player encountering a TFT player, with δ being the common discount 
factor, are 
 
PTFT/TFT = a + δa + δ2a + ... 
 
   a 
   =   ––––– 
          1 - δ 
 
and 
 
PALL D/TFT = b + δc + δ2c + ... 
 
     c 
     =   ––––– + b – c, 
             1 - δ 
 
resp. In an evolutionary perspective, cooperation pays (and may be successful in a population) 
if 
 
PTFT/TFT > PALL D/TFT, 
 
        → δ >! (b – a) / (b – c), 
 
as popularized for instance by Axelrod (1984/2006). 
 
According to this inequality, cooperation may become logically possible. But in fact it will 
have to emerge in a complex evolutionary process, as a new Nash equilibrium (NE) in a PD 
SG, different from the individualistic, hyper-rational, myopic ‘one-shot’ NE of a conventional 
GT perspective. 
 
The critical factors here are the given quantitative dilemma-prone incentive structure, i.e., the 
quantitative strength or weakness of the collective-good problem involved, i.e., a, b and c, 
relative to the common discount factor (δ), which can also be interpreted in a SG as the 
‘probability to meet the same interaction partner again next interaction’, i.e., the importance 
of the common future. Particularly, cooperation will come to be the superior strategy easier 
                                                 
3
 Either an infinitely or an indefinitely iterated interaction (or ‘game’). The end of the SG always lies beyond the 
current ‘planning horizon’ of the agents. 
4
 As is well-known, TFT always starts cooperatively and thereafter does what the other one has done the 
previous interaction. 
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(even in a population dominated by defection) the smaller the ‘opportunity costs of common 
cooperation’ (b - a ) in relation to the ‘opportunity costs of common defection’ (b - c), and the 
larger the importance of the future (δ) relative to (b - a)/(b - c). 
 
With some PD incentive structure given, social terms, i.e., short- or long-run perspective, 
become crucial:  If society, and agents in their interactions, have a sufficiently long-run 
perspective of common futurity (a large δ), given a sufficient awareness of their common 
interdependence, they will be able to solve the problem of overcoming the dilemma by 
overcoming their short-run dominant individualistic incentive maximize and, thus, to defect. 
If, however, their common future does not count high, formally a small δ, the condition above 
will not hold [there will be δ < (b-a)/(b-c)]. They will remain in the short-run individualistic 
rationality of ‘hyper-rational’ maximization, and thus in the NE of common defection, the 
social dilemma. 
 
In an EGT perspective this is reflected by the question whether a cooperative culture could be 
evolutionarily stable, i.e., could invade a defective population, or, in turn, not be invaded 
itself by a defective culture. Axelrod (1984/2006), for instance, has argued with some superior 
(more long-run) self-commitment of cooperators, favoring a high δ, while the defectors have a 
δ close to 0, since they defect always, independent of the future (of ‘meeting again’ and future 
reactions). If δ is high enough so that the inequality above holds, long-run SG payoffs 
transform the PD into a less cumbersome coordination game where cooperation becomes 
another NE. Finally, ‘meeting again’ may also have to do with the level of mobility, i.e., the 
probabilities of staying in or leaving the interaction ‘arena’, the size of a relevant social or 
spatial neighborhood, of the degree of segmentation of a population, among other things (see, 
e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2009; Hédoin 2010, 977-9). For the institutionalist tradition, the 
importance of futurity was extensively elaborated and introduced by John R. Commons 
(1934). 
 
We will not delve here into the manifold complex formal and theoretical aspects of an 
elaborated model and also will not explain all assumptions, elements, and implications of a 
full ‘process story’ required. For the purpose of this paper, just some core aspects suffice: 
 
First, considering the solution above as a sequence or process, the institutional solution can 
not come about through narrowly rational agents, i.e., short-run (i.e., hyper-rational) 
maximizers. We cannot explain a process or mechanism to achieve the superior (‘Pareto-
superior’) result with such ‘hyper-rational’ behavior. The latter would, even in a SG process, 
only be capable of generating a series of one-shot NEs (i.e., common defection, where the 
inequality would not hold, since δ remains too small). Thus, in a GT perspective, an 
institution can only emerge through some habituation, where agents learn to habitually 
abstain from striving for their short-run maximum. In this way, they would determine 
relatively high δs. The institution will thus have to be a ‘semi-conscious’ phenomenon. It 
typically will remain in that semi-conscious state as long as expectations of conformity with it 
are met, supported by the conditions of a favorable numerical result of the inequality above 
(i.e., the payoff-superiority of common cooperation; if only lingering somehow in the 
background, i.e., not deliberately calculated) and by mutually enforced cooperation. 
Therefore, institutional emergence is conditional on a learned broader and long-run 
rationality, overcoming the dominant short-run incentive to defect. That broader and long-run 
rationality will have to be habitually applied. In contrast, the institution may be abandoned 
through a more or less deliberate consideration, when a new (‘deliberate’) single-shot 
calculation (after some condition has changed, either payoffs or futurity/expectations) no 
 8 
longer justifies conformity with the old institution, i.e., when some ‘change’ took place, or 
after some ‘surprise’, ‘disappointment’, ‘frustration’, or ‘becoming exploited’ by others may 
have occurred. 
 
Second, introducing some stochastic aspect into individual behavior, the institution can 
emerge only on the basis of the individual motivations (1) to escape repeated frustration from 
common defection (from individualistically aspiring b and commonly receiving only c time 
after time), and (2) to learn and increase knowledge, and particularly to explore what a 
different behavior, namely common cooperation, may bring about (idle curiosity as Veblen 
would have put it), or to find a way to improve one’s economic situation, resp. (to gain 
common a’s rather than c’s), a case of Veblen’s instinct of workmanship. That is, the payoffs 
for common cooperation may not even be known (‘incomplete information’ in GT terms) but 
may get explored by searching and experimenting agents. The institution thus may emerge 
just out of an agent’s vision that there is more to be gained than repeated frustration. Agents 
who then make contributions to cooperation thus need to be imaginative, explorative, 
innovative, and creative. Therefore, broader individual agency capacities would need to be 
carefully defined for an evolutionary process, particularly for the individualistic perspective 
of conventional GT. 
 
Third, the agent who then starts to search and experiment with a different behavior will have 
to contribute repeatedly to the change of the others’ expectations in favor of cooperation. The 
process, thus, must be cumulative in the sense that all agents must repeatedly and interactively 
(sequentially) contribute (or, alternatively, will have to continue to cumulatively punish each 
other). 
 
Fourth, these agents also have to be risk-taking and not too envious. The first to send a signal 
for a potential better common future will have to take the risk of being exploited, at least once 
(thus, better to offer cooperation twice in a row—tit-for-2-tat (TF2T)—before returning to 
defection). He also will never be able to compensate for slightly smaller payoff, as compared 
to the other – if common cooperation should start in response to his cooperative action. This 
agent thus needs to be mainly focused on his own net gain, which he has to compare only with 
his payoff under continued common defection. Compared to this, he clearly will be better off 
over time. 
 
Fifth, with agents starting to learn, search, and experiment, and individual behaviors thus 
becoming (stochastically) diversified (in our two-strategies world, this usually means starting 
cooperation from previous defection), we finally introduce a population perspective (a 
population with many and heterogeneous agents, with initially unknown portions of defectors 
and cooperators). Agents then no longer can exactly tell the strategy of any particular other 
agent whom they (more or less randomly) will be matched with in the next interaction (rather 
than meeting exactly the same again next interaction to sanction him for earlier cooperative or 
defective behavior, as in the simple single shot above). Behavior thus is considered somewhat 
random, and agents will have to experience the ‘true’ strategy shares in the relevant 
population. The ‘pure’ expectation ‘to meet the same again’, δ, of the single-shot perspective 
above will be replaced by the expected ‘probability to meet a cooperative agent next 
interaction’, i.e., what we call ‘contingent trust’ δk (i.e., the no. of cooperators k over 
population size n). 
 
Sixth, while agents will have to experience such ‘contingent trust’, they will have to ‘know 
about’ as many agents as possible. Thus, even more capabilities of agents may have to be 
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considered and introduced into relevant models. Instances and model components of such 
enhanced agency assumptions will be memory length, monitoring capacity, building 
reputation and transmitting it in reputation chains, and some active partner selection based on 
the knowledge generated by these mechanisms, i.e., some (imperfect though) ‘preferential 
matching’, for instance, according to some social and/or geographical neighborhood 
topology, some population segment, peer group, social class, cluster, etc. 
 
In total, this indicates that in a (evolutionary) GT perspective the institution is as complex a 
thing as, and connected to an evolutionary process as complex as, it always was in the 
institutionalist perspective, although there basically remains some ‘rational’ calculation at the 
core of the GT model and process. (‘Rational calculation’, however, may easily loose any 
guiding potential for individual agents in any complex evolutionary process5.) 
 
In this way, the institution emerging is conceived of as an instrumental device to solve a 
defined complex decision structure in a process, that could not be solved other than through 
habituated, i.e., institutionalized behavior with a learned broader rationality (that is, truly 
‘recognized interdependence’ and a more long-run perspective) of agents. The instrumental 
perspective of the GT conception of institutions is embedded in the theoretical and 
methodological perspective of institutional emergence. 
 
Against this background, an extensive proper EIGT definition of an institution may be given 
as follows: 
 
An institution is a habituated social rule for the decision/behavior of individual agents for 
(infinitely, or indefinitely) recurrent and multipersonal (i.e., directly interdependent and thus 
genuinely social) situations (repeated direct interactions, SGs), with social coordination 
problems (and particularly collective-good problems/social dilemmas) involved, that has 
gained, through a process of social learning, a general approval so that it can inform the 
agents about mutual (and mutually consistent) expectations of behavior, and about the fact that 
with unilateral deviation from the rule (i.e., unilateral defection) other agents also will deviate 
in the future – so that eventually all will be worse-off with mutual defection than with rule-
conforming behavior (an endogenous sanction mechanism)6. 
 
Now, despite this instrumental reference point of the solution, the upper left cell of the 
‘normal-form’ structure (the matrix), also the one-shot NE of mutual defection in the lower 
right, resulting in the individualistic, myopic, and hyper-rational environment, can of course 
be considered a ‘culture’. Repeated defection as an individualistic culture, however, can, in 
the GT perspective and on the background of the above definition of an institution, be 
conceived of only in the sense of a more simple social rule, which does not need the 
endogenous sanction mechanism nor a habituation to make people adhere to it. In a recurrent 
one-shot perspective, agents would just spontaneously follow repeatedly and schematically 
                                                 
5
 Just note that in complex models, evolutionary process with replication and, with this, an ever-changing social 
environment may easily make prediction (calculation) of relative individual success impossible and hence proper 
‘rational’ individual decision infeasible for any real-world agent. Even if the agent might be able to properly 
regard the past, any calculated decision, proper for past experience, may turn out to be fully wrong under the 
new (changed) environment of the next period. Even if a neoclassical individual could solve n-dimensional 
differential equation systems all the time in a neoclassical world, it could not calculate complex simulations of 
interactions in a population and its replications in its path-dependent and idiosyncratic, i.e., unpredictable 
process. 
6
 This definition of an instrumental institution, referring to a PD-SG problem structure and process, where the 
solution requires a sacrifice of the short-run maximum, and hence an endogenous sanction mechanism and 
habituation, was basically developed first by Schotter 1981 (see also Schotter, Schwoediauer 1980). 
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their individualistic, short-run, hyper-rational ‘best answer’ and ‘dominant strategy’ by 
(mutually) defecting. No sacrifice, no sanction, no learning, no process, and no habituation 
required. Therefore, we just call this a social rule rather than an institution. A social rule is 
what individualistic agents follow spontaneously, in their very short-run individualistic 
interest, given the same behavior of others – a short-run interest in being coordinated. It most 
generally reflects some coordination in a so called coordination game. Thus, a social rule 
applies whenever it is in the interest of an individual to behave that way when the other one 
behaves that way too, even in a short-run ‘one-shot’ perspective. Social rules thus apply to 
any simple coordination game where it is in everyone’s interest just to be coordinated (see, for 
instance, basic traffic rules as the usual prototype). 
 
This coordination in a PD, however, is a ‘negative’ one (common defection). Note again that 
hyper-rational individuals do not need to overcome a complex problem here in order to 
establish defection as their behavioral (social) rule. In the PD SG, common defection thus is 
easily established as a social rule. If I (have to) assume that the other one defects, I am (hyper-
rationally) forced to defect myself. However, other than in a coordination game, there will be 
no problem solved in a PD through this way of ‘coordination’7. 
 
In other words, there immediately appears an obvious asymmetry between the ‘culture’ of 
instrumental problem-solving through learned and emerging cooperation motivated by the 
striving for problem solving, and the ‘culture’ of defection motivated by individualist myopic 
maximization and immediate individual interest. The social institution of cooperation is 
fundamentally more requiring than commonly following just the (individualistic) social rule 
of defection. 
 
The latter motivation also includes unilateral defection, thus aspired exploitation of the other 
one, if the other one for some reason could be led to stick to cooperation. Therefore, also the 
upper right and lower left constellations are covered by that individualistic ‘culture’. This, in 
turn, implies, and reveals, that the true motivation here is not just individualist myopic 
maximization, but in fact the striving for exploitation of the other one (or to prevent getting 
exploited oneself) — as the PD payoff structure obviously indicates. Hence, the true 
motivation, justification, and normative warrant here is what Veblen has termed invidious 
distinction, the quest for differential status and power, embedded in a short-run maximization 
behavior. Note that the latter can, in fact not be realized without exploitation. The motivation 
to defect in any of these cases (unilateral or mutual defection) is to exploit the other one and 
to gain differential status and power — an underlying ceremonial valuation (to anticipate the 
institutionalist argument below). 
 
If all are that ‘clever’ and ‘hyper-rational’, general mutual defection necessarily follows. But, 
if an additional story about lasting power and status differentials in a hierarchical 
environment can be told so that the other agent can be induced to continue to cooperate, to 
accept the superior’s position and his own inferior position, we may also consider ‘cultures’ 
of unequal constellations (see below Section 5.2). 
 
                                                 
7
 Note also that on this basis, the solution of a dilemma is specifically called ‘cooperation’, while the solution of 
a coordination game is called just ‘coordination’ — while the umbrella term for both would be also 
coordination. Similarly, social rules is used as an umbrella term for both institutions as defined (rules plus 
sacrifice and sanctions) and specific social rules to solve coordination games, where coordination is in 
everyone’s immediate individualistic interest. With this, we continue to follow the GT terminology as 
established in the EIGT. 
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But let us consider first the institutionalist ‘story’ in more detail now. 
 
 
1.2) The Institutionalist Definition – and its Equivalence With the GT Perspective 
 
Bush (1987) defines an institution as 
 
‘a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior’ (p. 1076). 
 
While this is consistent with most definitions in the institutionalist tradition, it needs some 
clarification in relation to our GT informed definition as a device to ‘solve’ a specified social 
dilemma problem. 
 
‘Patterns’ of Behavior 
First, ‘patterns of behavior’ can be easily and straightforwardly translated just into 
‘behavioral social rules’ in the broad sense (see fn. 7), where institutions (= rules ‘plus 
sanctions’) are included as mentioned. The patterns will typically be a structure with a time 
dimension (over time) and an interpersonal or social dimension (across agents). 
 
‘Prescribed’ Patterns -- Instrumental Norms 
Second, ‘socially prescribed’ stresses the fact that institutions typically appear to the 
individual agents as normative phenomena and prescriptions (be they objectively instrumental 
or ceremonial), while the original ‘functional’ (instrumental) context of their emergence (as 
illustrated in the GT perspective above) has often faded away in an individual lifetime or over 
generations of a population. Correspondingly, Bush stresses the idea of a (instrumental) 
‘norm’:  The idea of social prescription would apply, and perhaps particularly so, to 
 
‘all problem-solving (purposive) behavior. The community at large has a stake in the manner 
in which its tools and intelligence are brought to bear on its life processes. Those patterns of 
behavior perceived to be vital to the survival of the community are the most carefully 
prescribed and carry the heaviest sanctions’ (p. 1077). 
 
This ‘norm’ is mostly not just a behavioral rule (or institution) conveyed by social 
conditioning and enculturation, and not just some semi-conscious habituation, but, above that, 
the explicit feeling of individuals of a socially required behavior, whether instrumental or 
ceremonial. (We will discuss later how we can derive such ‘norm’-atization and even 
‘ceremonialization’ out of a benchmark of an ideal instrumental ‘functional’ problem-solving 
behavior — see Section 5.2 again.) 
 
‘Correlated’ Behavior 
Third, the idea of ‘correlated’ behavior, in particular, is not that obvious, from a GT 
perspective: 
 
• In our ‘instrumental’ derivation of institutional emergence in a game-theoretic 
context, behaviors are correlated, first, between two agents who ‘correlate’ their 
behaviors in face of a problem at hand, be this ‘correlated’ (mutual) cooperation or 
(mutual) defection in a PD, the two basic forms of ‘coordination’ in a PD. 
Correlation here, therefore, is just a ‘coordination’ in the broad sense, be it 
‘correlated’ cooperation or ‘correlated’ defection. At first, this would logically 
apply to a single interaction of each agent, i.e., a one-shot decision (one 
interaction, the ‘game’ played just once). 
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• However, any such behavior must also be correlated over time, as a recurrent, 
repetitive, and thus rule- or institution-based behavior (remember that we have 
argued in a SG, particularly in a sequential process). In fact, a rule or institution 
would be no full-fledged rule/institution (or ‘coordinated strategies’) if it was not 
repetitive/recurrent, and thus correlated with itself over time. 
 
‘Patterns of correlated behavior’, thus, also means that institutional behavior 
 
‘is not random but purposeful […] [and in this sense] correlated’ (p. 1077). 
 
A ‘Set’ of Patterns of Behavior 
Fourth, a ‘set’ of correlated behavior thus may refer either to a set of coordinated (pairs of) 
agents carrying the rule or institution across many agents at one point of time, and/or the set 
of repetitions of coordinated behaviors of pairs of agents, i.e., a set of coordinated actions 
over time. 
 
It should have become clear from this that GT modeling may be of some help to sort the 
different logical dimensions of ‘a set of patterns of correlated behavior’. For an illustration of 
the mentioned components of the institutionalist definition of an institution, see Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Components of the Institutionalist Definition of an Institution as ‘Sets of 
Correlated Behavior’--Illustration. 
 
 
Repetition of 
Interaction 
No. of Agents 
Involved 
 
 
Once (‘one-shot’) 
(‘correlation’ just across agents) 
 
Many Over Time (recurrent, sequential) 
(‘correlation’ cross-sectional & 
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(one pairing) 
 
Behaviors ‘correlated’ between two 
agents 
 
 
A ‘pattern’ of behaviors 
‘correlated’ between two agents and with 
themselves over time 
 
 
 
Many Pairs 
(in a population) 
 
 
A ‘set’ of behaviors ‘correlated’ 
within each pair of agents and 
among pairs 
(with the no. of elements of the set 
equal to the no. of pairs) 
 
 
A ‘set’ of ‘patterns’ of ‘correlated’ 
behavior (within each pair and among 
pairs) ‘correlated’ with themselves over 
time (with the no. of elements of the set 
equating the no. of pairs). 
 
 
 
Also, for an illustration of the logic of the components of a rule or institution, from an 
individual action to a ‘set of patterns of correlated behavior’, see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The Logic of a ‘Set of Patterns of Correlated Behavior’--Illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
A, B = a behavior, an individual action (one agent’s action at one point of time); 
C = behaviors (actions) A and B ‘correlated’ between (at least) two agents (at one point of time); 
D, E = ‘patterns’ of behavior (of each one agent), each ‘correlated’ only with itself over time; 
F = a ‘pattern’ of behaviors C, ‘correlated’ with itself over time (a social rule or institution); 
G = a ‘set’ of ‘patterns’ of behaviors C, ‘correlated’ among (at least two) pairs of agents; 
H = a ‘set’ of ‘patterns’ of behaviors G, ‘correlated’ with itself over time. 
 
 
 
2) Values Correlating Patterns of Behavior:  Instrumental or Ceremonial Warrant 
 
 
Another important aspect, specific of the epistemological sophistication of Institutionalism, 
which has not been explicitly accounted for in usual GT so far, is values. As Bush puts it: 
 
‘Values function as the “correlators” of behavior within and among patterns of behavior’. 
[That is] ‘two behaviors [..] [are] correlated by a value’ (p. 1077). 
 
However, as indicated already above, this appears equivalent and reconcilable with an EIGT 
perspective:  Consider again that cooperative behaviors in a PD (and also coordinated 
behaviors in a coordination game, where a Pareto-superior coordination between two 
coordination solutions in a 2x2 normal form exists, which aspires or attains this superior 
coordination8) are correlated through the instrumental valuation (the motivation, or norm) of 
problem-solving, i.e., overcoming the very dilemma (or distrust, risk-aversion in the 
                                                 
8
 The prototype in modern complexity economics of such a coordination game with two different coordination 
solutions, a Pareto-inferior and a Pareto-superior one, is W. B. Arthur’s model of a random technology choice 
with two different technologies (superior, inferior)—where any solution may emerge (see Arthur 1989). Those 
familiar with GT may also consider another structure, the Stag-Hunt game (or assurance game) as an example, a 
coordination structure with a Pareto-superior solution, which however is not attained by non-trusting, risk-averse 
agents. 
No. of 
Agents / 
Pairs 
t 
F 
… 
 
 
Agent 4 
(interacting) 
Agent 3 
 
 
 
Agent 2 
(interacting) 
Agent 1 
1              2              3  … 
A 
B 
C 
E 
 
D 
G 
 
 
… 
H 
… 
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coordination-game case with a Pareto-superior solution) by a motivation of problem-solving. 
This instrumental motive or basic valuation seems quite obvious:  We have to assume that 
agents are motivated to cooperate (in a social dilemma) through a prior value-decision to 
solve a common and collective problem to improve their situation. 
 
Intended hyper-rational maximization (in the PD), on the other hand, i.e., putting oneself 
above and trying to exploit the other one, and, thus, either unilateral or mutual exploitation 
(unilateral or mutual defection), are justifiable — also in GT terms — in no other way than 
through the prior fundamental valuation of invidious distinction, i.e., the striving for superior 
power and status, in a word, through what institutionalists since Veblen have called 
ceremonial value. According to ceremonial values, agents are after distinction, differential 
status and power, rather than problem-solving. 
 
The ‘correlating’ role of instrumental and ceremonial values now has been most important for 
the institutionalist argument and scheme of institutional dynamics. EIGT can learn about the 
value base of decisions/strategies from this, and the theory of institutional change has paved a 
way here already, through the elaboration of a system of resulting potential forms of value-
behavior-structures. 
 
The basic value-behavior-scheme (or structure) is 
 
B-V-B, 
 
with V for the correlating value and B for the behaviors. V ‘correlates’ behaviors B, among 
both agents and over time as indicated above. 
 
Note that there can be different interconnected constellations of values and patterns of 
behaviors, among agents and/or over time, where 
 
‘the correlation of [two] behavioral patterns entails a [third] behavioral pattern’ (p. 1078), 
 
as illustrated according to Bush’s explanation in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Behaviors Correlated by Values -- Illustration. 
 
Correlation Among 
Agents 
Correlation 
Among Agents 
 
 
B1 
 
V1 
 
B2 
 
   
V2 
 
 
 
B4 
 
V3 
 
B3 
 
 
 
For instance, while two pairs of ‘(patterns of) behavior’ [of each two agents (1, 2) and (3, 4)], 
(B1, B2) and (B3, B4), may be ‘correlated’ by instrumental values (V1, V3), the (patterns of) 
behaviors of agents 2 and 3, B2 and B3, may be ‘correlated’ by a ceremonial value V2. 
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Since the relationship between two patterns of behavior is fundamentally characterized by the 
type of V (instrumental or ceremonial), institutional change basically requires a change of the 
value basic to that institutional structure. We will return to this later. 
 
 
 
3) The Asymmetry in the Dichotomic Institutional Structure: 
Ceremonial Dominance and Ceremonial Encapsulation 
 
 
3.1) The Asymmetric Value Structure in Both Perspectives 
 
Again, behavior warranted by ceremonial values is based on invidious distinction, and 
aspirations of differential status and power. The logic of ceremonial warrant of 
institutionalized patterns of behavior is, as Veblen has already put it, one of 
 
‘sufficient reason’, 
 
which means that ceremonial values refer to just tradition, received authority, some 
plausibility, suitable myths, etc., and are beyond critical scrutiny or scientific inquiry. The 
operative criterion for such behavior thus is 
 
‘ceremonial adequacy’, 
 
i.e., just conformity to the legitimizations of differential power and status without any proof of 
real efficacy – conformity to the myths is just sufficient (cf. Bush, pp. 1079-80). 
 
Instrumental values, on the other hand, are bound to problem solving, and thus the logic of 
instrumental warrant is that of 
 
‘efficient cause’ 
 
rather than just ‘sufficient reason’. The operative criterion by which instrumentally warranted 
behavior is judged, therefore, is that of 
 
‘instrumental efficiency’ 
 
(rather than ‘ceremonial adequacy’), i.e., efficacy. 
 
Typically, with new ‘technological’ knowledge (in the broadest sense), instrumental behavior 
will have to be scrutinized and adapted. Proper (instrumental) behavioral adaptation, in turn, 
will ‘require changes in the instrumental values that correlate such behavior’ (p. 1080), i.e., 
change to reinforce instrumental valuing. This will particularly be feasible if the institutional 
structure is warranted by instrumental value. 
 
With this, there also are two basic types of patterns of behavior that would consistently and 
fully relate to the two valuations, i.e., instrumentally and ceremonially warranted patterns. 
 
In GT terms, and in the context of a social dilemma, we have made the distinction between an 
instrumentally warranted institution and a ceremonially warranted social rule, reflecting 
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already the above mentioned asymmetry. In particular, dilemma-solving behavior is subject to 
the value criterion of ‘efficient cause’ or ‘instrumental efficiency’, an effort with a learning 
process attaining the Pareto-superior solution9, while defective behavior (in a PD) can be 
considered to be subject to ‘sufficient reason’, i.e., just the belief and hope that the agent can 
(and should) gain a maximum in the short run, which he knows he can attain only at the 
expense of the others. The institutionalist value-asymmetry thus neatly applies to that GT 
problem setting so that the GT perspective could be opened up for more institutionalist input, 
and vv. 
 
 
3.2) Resulting Institutionalist Value-Behavior Structures 
 
This has several implications for resulting value-behavior structures: 
 
• First, as said, it is immediately intelligible that there are two pure types of the 
basic value-behavior schemes that consistently relate to one of the two valuations: 
 
Bc-Vc-Bc 
and 
Bi-Vi-Bi , 
 
where c and i stand for ceremonial and instrumental, resp. 
 
• Second, however, real-world behavior typically is ‘dialectical’ in the sense that 
both ceremonial and instrumental characteristics are involved. 
 
For example, institutionalists from Veblen on have dealt with such ‘dialectical’ 
behavior:  Fashion clothing is both instrumental clothing and ceremonial distinction, 
and the professor’s teaching behind the lectern is both instrumental teaching and 
ceremonial status differentiation between him and the students. Veblen and Ayres 
have also investigated the ‘ceremonial cleanliness’, the ‘cult of the tub’, with its waste 
of hot water – which has become particularly relevant in recent times of body and 
beauty cults, ubiquitous hot showers and one-arm water taps that always admix hot 
water, water pollution with all kinds of detergents, mostly used in abundance, and 
ubiquitous ‘sanitation’ and ‘beauty’ industries (see also examples and discussion 
given by Bush, pp. 1081 f.). 
 
This means there are patterns of behavior to be symbolized by Bci (or equivalently, 
Bic), which are ambivalent. Thus, their final significance depends on the type of 
value that correlates them. Hence, the following forms can be added to the list of 
specific schemes (see Bush, pp. 1082-4): 
 
Bci-Vc-Bci and Bci-Vi-Bci , 
but also 
Bc-Vc-Bci and Bi-Vi-Bci . 
 
                                                 
9
 Note that the use of the Pareto Criterion throughout this paper is confined to the simple examples of symmetric 
payoff matrices with two different potential equilibria. We do not want to argue that the particular Pareto 
Criterion in general would lead us far in evolutionary-institutional economics, in the VAFB paradigm or EIGT. 
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That is, both ceremonial and instrumental values can correlate either two 
‘dialectical’ patterns of behavior or one ‘pure’ form of their own kind with another 
‘dialectical’ form. 
 
• Third, the asymmetry between instrumental and ceremonial modes of valuation, as 
mentioned, causes an asymmetry between the value-behavior-structures that 
instrumental or ceremonial values warrant. 
 
Particularly, the instrumental logic and operational criterion of efficient cause and 
instrumental efficiency are inapplicable to purely ceremonial behavior: 
 
‘Instrumental valuation cannot rationalize purely ceremonial behavior’ (p. 1083). 
 
The ceremonial logic and operational criterion of sufficient reason and ceremonial 
adequacy, on the other hand, are less limited:  Any behavior, including 
instrumental behavior, may be ‘rationalized’, absorbed, used, or misused, by 
ceremonial valuation, since its logic and operational criterion are ‘weaker’, so to 
speak, i.e., less demanding. 
 
For example, think of the massive progress made in the natural, technological, 
organizational, medical, psychological or social sciences (including, by the way, game 
theory) through arms and warfare research, typically justified by myths like ‘our 
nation is under threat’, ‘we need to help others who are under threat’, ‘they don’t 
share our values’, ‘they are different’, etc. Also, you may think of the justification of 
some reasonable and effective social caring behavior within and through the churches 
through ‘the will of god’, or perhaps of some other socially effective behaviors 
through ‘the national interest’, ‘the interest of the economy’, etc. In fact, there has 
been generated a rich stock of applied institutionalist research on such issues since 
Veblen’s critical analyses of dominating myths and belief systems. 
 
In GT terms, we would have to consider again the exploitation constellations in the 
upper right and lower left cells of the 2x2 PD matrix, where instrumental 
(cooperative) behavior of some agents would be dominated by others who are 
motivated by invidious payoff maximization for their own benefit. Thus, we have 
to assume that these whole situations are dominated and characterized by the 
ceremonial valuation. This clearly would go beyond any conventional GT 
perspective and would require additional assumptions, theoretical justification, and 
proper ‘story-telling’. GT obviously is not well prepared for the conception of 
lasting asymmetric behaviors, i.e., combinations of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ 
behaviors. But again, we consider such additional story-telling about the 
emergence of a dominating ceremonial warrant out of an instrumentally warranted 
behavioral solution in Section 5.2 below. 
 
 
3.3) ‘Ceremonial Encapsulation’ in Particular 
 
In case of such ceremonial enclosure of ‘dialectical’ or even of purely instrumental patterns of 
behavior, institutionalists are talking of encapsulation: 
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‘In these instances, instrumental behavior is “encapsulated” within a ceremonially warranted 
behavioral pattern, thereby incorporating instrumental behavior in a ceremonially prescribed 
outcome’ (p. 1084). 
 
For instance, Marx’s conception of ‘moral depreciation’, i.e., premature scrapping of 
commodities under the pressures of competitive race among firms, would fall into this 
category of instrumental aspects of behavior being ceremonially encapsulated. In such cases, 
commodities may display some instrumentally reduced functioning through wearout so that 
replacement or reinvestment would basically be in order sooner or later, but in fact they will 
prematurely be put to waste as they no longer function as a vehicle of invidious distinction 
(e.g., are no longer fashionable or no longer a cutting-edge model of a technology), this being 
more a symbolic and signaling action. The case could be symbolized by Bc-Vc-Bci or Bci-Vc-Bci 
as already introduced, but also by Bc-Vc-Bi and even Bci-Vc-Bi , as introduced below. 
 
The forms of ceremonial encapsulation, thus, are manifold. Beyond the two forms already 
mentioned in the context of ‘dialectical’ behavior, Bci-Vc-Bci and Bc-Vc-Bci, it may also occur 
with ‘pure’ behaviors, where purely instrumental behavior is correlated with purely 
ceremonial behavior, the first being dominated and encapsulated by ceremonial valuing: 
 
Bc-Vc-Bi . 
 
And, of course, another feasible form correlates purely instrumental behavior with 
‘dialectical’ behavior (and encapsulates both), i.e., even ‘dialectical’ and purely instrumental 
behaviors can be encapsulated to serve a ceremonially prescribed outcome: 
 
Bci-Vc-Bi . 
 
Note that these two forms can not have parallels under ‘instrumental conditions’. Because of 
the asymmetry, instrumental values cannot justify any purely ceremonial behavior, so no 
constellations Bi-Vi-Bc, Bci-Vi-Bc and Bc-Vi-Bc are feasible. 
 
But, on the other hand, also Bi-Vc-Bi is no possible constellation, as ceremonial values cannot 
justify only pure instrumental behaviors. See Figure 4 for an overview of the forms. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Forms of Ceremonially and Instrumentally Warranted Patterns of Behavior 
(Variants of Value-Behavior-Schemes) (after Bush, p. 1082). 
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From the GT perspective, we are able now to draw an obvious analogy of the cases for a 
normal form PD. While the institutionalist scheme just consisted of two lists of B-V-B 
structures, we attain a more elaborated two-dimensional scheme, where we can sort the B-V-B 
patterns according to the constellations of interacting ‘cultures’ of cooperating or defecting 
behaviors (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: The Equivalence of the Institutionalist B-V-B Cases and the ‘Interacting-
Cultures’ Constellations in the EIGT Perspective:  A More Elaborated Two-
Dimensional Scheme. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            Player II 
 
 
 
C 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
C 
 
Bi-Vi-Bi 
Bi-Vi-Bci 
Bci-Vi-Bci 
 
 
Bi-Vc-Bc 
Bi-Vc-Bci 
Bci-Vc-Bc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Player I 
 
 
D 
 
Bc-Vc-Bi 
Bci-Vc-Bi 
Bc-Vc-Bci 
 
 
Bc-Vc-Bc 
Bci-Vc-Bci 
 
 
 
 
We can completely allot the instititutionalist patterns to the GT constellations. We also 
immediately see the asymmetry of the cases between the three instrumental and the five 
ceremonial cases, which is reflected in the GT scheme as three cells ceremonial cases vs. only 
one cell of instrumental solutions. (Note that the B-V-B cases repeat between the ‘Upper 
Right’ and ‘Lower Left’ cells. We have just mirror-inverted them to accentuate the 
parallelism between Upper Right and Lower Left.) Of course, only the ‘ceremonial cells’ 
contain the forms of ceremonial encapsulation (except the extreme case of Bc-Vc-Bc under 
mutual defection in the Lower Right). 
 
While the forms with ‘pure’ behaviors of the same kind may be obvious cases, the forms with 
‘dialectical’ behaviors, with mixed ‘pure’ and ’dialectical’ behaviors, and with mixed ‘pure’ 
behaviors of different kinds may require some more ‘story telling’. While this, however, is 
not our main thrust here, Bush (1987) is full of cases from institutionalist research allocated to 
the different B-V-B patterns. We will indicate some of them below in the context of forms of 
institutional change. 
 
Finally, note that the arrows indicate progressive/regressive institutional change. See below 
for more detail on this. 
 
 
3.4) ‘Ceremonial Dominance’ and the ‘Permissiveness’ of the Institutional Structure 
 
The asymmetry between the logics of ‘ceremonial’ and ‘instrumental’ valuation according to 
which ceremonial warrant can encapsulate more forms of behavior, is consistent with, and in 
fact stems from, the general comprehension of institutions in the Veblenian tradition 
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according to which institutions are always and unavoidably past-bound, and thus prone to a 
ceremonial dominance, particularly in traditional, hierarchical, and predatory societies. 
 
In fact, specific cultures and nations vary in the ‘permissiveness’ of their institutional 
arrangements (value-behavior-structures) vis-à-vis new (‘technological’) knowledge 
(‘increases of the social knowledge fund’). Some few have been allowing for a 
(‘progressive’) change towards more instrumentally warranted behavioral patterns. Hence, 
that asymmetry and the resulting ceremonial dominance are a ‘gradual’ phenomenon. An 
ideal ‘index of ceremonial dominance’ (to be formalized yet10) would be inversely related to 
the degree of permissiveness:  The higher that index, i.e., the greater ceremonial dominance, 
the lower the permissiveness of the institutional structure of an economy towards new 
knowledge and its full instrumental use. 
 
In GT terms, we may think here of some technological or organizational change, causing a 
change of the payoff structure, 
 
1. e.g., in a coordination game with a Pareto-superior and a Pareto-inferior 
coordination solution, so that the former superior coordination becomes the 
inferior one and vice versa, 
 
2. transforming a coordination game into a PD and vice versa, 
 
3. increasing the relative payoffs for common cooperation in a PD so that common 
defection pays relatively less and cooperation becomes easier feasible in a SG 
process, and vice versa (while the basic PD structure as such is maintained). 
 
Also, we might assume some change in other external conditions so that the expectations 
change (i.e., δ) with implications for the probabilities with which instrumentally or 
ceremonially warranted behavioral patterns come to prevail in an evolutionary process in a 
population. 
 
Combining changes in knowledge, payoffs, and expectations (and thus — in the GT 
perspective — in the long-run calculations of relative benefits and costs of different 
strategies) with the valuing aspect we may say that the more ‘permissive’ the value structure 
in games that undergo such changes would be, e.g., the more the agents will be after long-run 
and inclusive problem solving (Vc → Vi), the more a behavioral change towards a new, 
adapted, and now more proper and superior, or more instrumental, solution would appear 
feasible. But nevertheless, agents need to have a strong instrumental-value motivation in order 
to overcome, in a sequential process, the incentive to defect that always dominates in the 
short-run, even if the long-run calculation is in favor of cooperation. 
 
Therefore, note again that, in GT, as already the approach and structure of the simple single-
shot solution above reveals, the degree of permissiveness itself is not only positively related 
to, but in fact would change uno actu with the long-run calculations of the agents based on 
both the payoff structure and the importance of the common future — a ‘rational’, calculative 
explanation of the relative weights of the two types of values. Particularly, with favorable 
calculative conditions, agents, in the GT perspective, will usually be more inclined towards 
instrumentally warranted solutions — if not other aspects that may explain a ceremonial 
                                                 
10
 However, see O’Hara 1997, 112-16, for a formal operationalization and application of an ICD for the cases 
under investigation there. We do not need to delve deeper into this here. 
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dominance would prevail. The latter will indeed play a role in the specific argument in favor 
of dominant ceremonialism that we will deal with in Section 5.2. 
 
 
 
4) The Process and Forms of Institutional Change 
 
 
4.1) Combinations of Instrumental vs. Ceremonial ‘Feasibilities’:  The ‘Institutional 
Space’ 
 
It follows from the above that new knowledge, together with related instrumental patterns of 
behavior, can be either ‘encapsulated’ within ceremonially warranted patterns of behavior or 
‘embedded’ within instrumentally warranted patterns of behavior. 
 
While new knowledge basically supports instrumental valuation (see our argument above on 
the support of a proper set of conditions and a ‘favorable’ calculation for instrumentally 
warranted solutions), the ‘index of ceremonial dominance’ eventually is indicative of the 
degree in which new knowledge is allowed to be used in the community’s problem-solving 
process. For instance, under strong ceremonial dominance, 
 
‘knowledge that cannot be reconciled with the need to justify existing patterns of status, 
power, and other forms of invidious distinctions would not be intentionally sanctioned’ (p. 
1091). 
 
The asymmetric structure between ceremonial and instrumental warrant, ‘allowance’, or 
‘feasibility’ of behaviors now defines an ‘institutional space’ within which we not only can 
define different sectors according to these value or feasibility constellations, but furthermore 
can also illustrate the motions of institutional change (Bush, p. 1092; see Figure 6 below, with 
the formal B-V-B structures added that apply in each case): 
 
(1a) When behavioral patterns are both instrumentally feasible (warranted, allowed 
for) and ceremonially feasible (warranted, allowed for), in this way meeting both 
‘sufficient reason’ and ‘efficient cause’, or ‘ceremonial adequacy’ and 
‘instrumental efficiency’, we clearly face the case (and sector) of ceremonial 
encapsulation since this implies (because of the asymmetry) a dominant 
ceremonial warrant. Here then, the institutional structure of an economy allows for 
benefiting from instrumental behavior that at the same time can be ceremonially 
justified and utilized, misused, and, in fact, encapsulated (see Figure 6, upper left 
sector). 
 
(1b) In dynamic terms, if an increase in the knowledge fund would trigger 
compensatory efforts not to change the value structure, the system would remain 
in the upper left sector of both instrumental and ceremonial feasibility under 
ceremonial warrant, a case of ongoing and enforced ceremonial encapsulation 
(remaining in the upper left sector). 
 
(2a) If behavioral patterns were instrumentally infeasible but ceremonially feasible 
under dominant ceremonial valuation (ceremonial warrant), they were purely 
ceremonial, a complete dominance of the ‘myth structure’, a full ‘loss of 
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instrumental efficiency’ (Bush, p. 1092), with instrumentally warranted patterns 
completely excluded (upper right sector). We are talking of quasi-religious effects 
here. 
 
(2b) In a dynamic perspective, if ceremonial dominance would further increase and 
the economy moved from the ceremonial-encapsulation subspace into this sector, 
excluding more and more instrumental behaviors, this would be indicative of 
‘regressive’ institutional change, i.e., an even greater dominance of ceremonial 
over instrumental values (and behaviors), of total ideology, myths, and received 
belief systems over knowledge (moving from the upper left to the upper right 
sector). 
 
(3a) Finally, those parts of behavioral patterns that are instrumentally feasible but 
ceremonially infeasible will normally be excluded under ceremonial dominance 
(lower left sector). 
 
(3b) In a dynamic perspective, however, if ceremonial dominance could be reduced 
after an increase in the social knowledge fund, this would be indicative of 
‘progressive’ institutional change, i.e., an increasing weight of instrumental over 
ceremonial values and with this of instrumental behaviors. Then the economy 
would move from the upper left into the lower left sector. 
 
 
Figure 6: The ‘Institutional Space’ in the Interface of Instrumental Feasibility (Warrant) 
and Ceremonial Feasibility (Warrant). 
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Note: (1) = Ongoing/enforced Ceremonial Encapsulation (with a constant ceremonial dominance). 
(2) = Regressive Institutional Change (increasing ceremonial dominance). 
(3) = Progressive Institutional Change (decreasing ceremonial dominance). 
 
 
4.2) The Forms of Institutional Change in Particular 
 
As said, institutional change is defined by a change in (the ‘index’ of) ceremonial dominance 
which in turn only occurs with a change in the value structure (Bush, p. 1094), i.e., in the 
relative dominance of ceremonial or instrumental warrant. And there are three forms of 
institutional change identified: 
 
(1) Ongoing and enforced ceremonial encapsulation will then imply that any increase of 
the knowledge fund, any new knowledge, and thus any potential increase of instrumental 
patterns of behavior will be offset, under a continuing dominance of ceremonial values in the 
community, by concomitant or reactive increases in ceremonial ‘mythology’ and valuation, 
and thus ceremonial patterns of behavior are supported and instrumental behavior 
encapsulated. The status quo ante will be maintained and reinforced. In this case the ‘index’ 
of ceremonial dominance and the value structure basically remain unchanged. 
 
As a major example, consider the technical progress made in the last decades through the 
digital microelectronic technologies. Now consider, what part of the effective use of the new 
facilities and equipment is devoted to just ceremonial activities rather than effective potential 
social problem-solving and related communication, information, and calculation. What part is 
used to divert people rather from social (and individual) problem-solving, engaging them in 
just killing time, distracting them from the social problems as well as their individual 
problems, tending to make them addicted, involving them in ‘sex&crime’ worlds (virtual or 
real), promoting global sex&crime industries, money laundering, generating and promoting 
violence, social isolation, invidious distinctions – but also surveillance and control, and so 
forth … ? (see, e.g., Adkisson 2004, particularly on ceremonialism with respect to intellectual 
property rights; see also Gallaway, Kinnear 2002). One might try to make an empirical 
estimation (through case studies) of instrumental vs. ceremonial portions in the real use of 
those technologies. 
 
Furthermore, decentralized systems based on net-technologies and nets of independent agents 
in the new economy may be dominated and restricted by big powerful bureaucratic hierarchies 
of international corporations. They form supplier networks that are hierarchically directed and 
restricted by the powerful hub of such a global hierarchy, i.e., hub&spoke networks that have 
come to dominate the global spatial organization of industries nowadays. Many power-based 
contractual nets have turned out, through critical institutional analysis, to be less problem-
solving constructions but rather complicated machines to generate windfall profits accruing at 
the most powerful agents (see, e.g., Hayden and Bolduc 2000). 
 
Applied institutionalist research is full of cases of reinforced ceremonial encapsulation (for the 
media industries, see, e.g., Champlin, Knoedler 2002). Institutionalists such as L.F. Junker, 
F.G. Hayden, J.R. Munkirs, W.M. Dugger and many others have empirically investigated 
ceremonial encapsulation in many fields, such as corporate dominance or pathogenic 
corporate agricultural and food production that causes public health to deteriorate (see Bush, 
pp. 1095 ff.). 
 
The late capitalist culture has developed, for instance, ceremonial life styles of affluence that 
prevents rationality to be fully realized, with the opulent life style of the developed countries 
of the Northern hemisphere, full of oversupplies of food, drugs, entertainment, diversion, 
events, and mass hysteria, while appropriating and absorbing for this purposes the resources 
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that the rest of the globe provides – and even more than these (in fact, the annual ecological 
footprint of the global North is 3 to 4 times their annual natural capacity). 
 
And, in fact, virtually all relevant knowledge on sustainable production, social justice, general 
trust and happiness, on preventing financial speculation and crises, environmental 
deterioration and climate crisis, etc. does already exist, but can rarely be applied because of a 
lack of instrumental collective action capacity, caused by a ceremonial encapsulation of 
knowledge and instrumental behavior. Similarly, we know virtually everything to effectively 
deal with most of the big social and humanitarian problems of societies and of the current 
global structures — but the taboos and belief-systems connected to the dominating ceremonial 
values (‘do not touch the wealth of the mega-rich investors’; ‘do not touch the “market”’; 
‘defend your freedom of the established ways of production, trade, consumption, mobility, 
leisure, tourism, etc.’, ‘do not restrict freedom and flexibility’, ‘push our national interests 
globally’, ‘protect “our” resources worldwide’, ‘kill the enemy’, etc.) largely prevent an 
instrumental turn in the existing patterns of behavior and valuations. 
 
Considering a GT perspective, we would argue that while all know about the superiority of the 
collective-action (cooperative) solution and the conditions to get there (‘complete 
information’), the dominant individualistic (ceremonial) incentive still remains to trigger 
general defection, with an inferior economic performance. In GT terms, we would consider 
again the critical role of the payoff structure and of the common future (expectations) to 
explain the ceremonial dominance — i.e., their bearing on the opportunities of problem 
solving in an economy. 
 
(2) Regressive institutional change, on the other hand, will displace instrumentally 
feasible and dialectical behavior, as indicated, i.e., an extreme case where ceremonial 
practices will not only dominate instrumental ones, but substitute them and in the end even 
imitate instrumental efficiency. It is the case of increasing ceremonial dominance, consistent 
with what Veblen had coined the triumph of imbecile institutions over life and culture. 
 
You may think of the quasi-religious and ‘fundamentalist’ ‘theories’ and anti-rationalisms all 
over the world, reactions of fear of turbulence and social uncertainty, propagating hatred and 
ignorance against ‘the others’, particularly against poor, needy, dependents, and migrants, 
including the alleged inferiority of other religions, races, and nations, of women or of non-
believers, e.g., postulating literal readings of the bible, counting generations back to Adam and 
Eve in the bible’s metaphors, accordingly claiming the world to be some 6000 years old, or 
arrogating ‘creationism’ to be seriously taught in schools, on an equal basis with scientific 
biology, history and anthropology, for the time being, reserving open totalitarianism for the 
future. 
 
Again, with regressive institutional change, there occurs a further loss of instrumental 
efficiency as (the index of) ceremonial dominance increases and the permissiveness towards 
the application of new knowledge and related instrumental behavior decreases. Knowledge 
and instrumental behavior will be fully displaced in the end by ceremonial behavior under a 
strong dominance of ceremonial values. 
 
(3) Progressive institutional change, on the contrary, will be experienced 
 
‘when for a given fund of knowledge ceremonial patterns of behavior are displaced by 
instrumental patterns of behavior’ (p. 1101). 
 
 25 
It would move the institutional structure into the lower left sector of the institutional space 
(see Figure 6 again), i.e., the ceremonial barriers that have prevented instrumental behavior to 
be realized (because it was ceremonially infeasible) can be torn down on the occasion of new 
technological knowledge. Here we would experience a decreasing (index of) ceremonial 
dominance, which can only come about through a displacement of ceremonial values by 
instrumental values. 
 
But it has always been obvious for institutionalists that progressive institutional change has 
strong limits, in a ceremonially dominated system and predatory society, particularly in face 
of an ongoing systemic crisis. The present system, despite its crises, still has the power to 
maintain sufficient diversion for its people and to keep up its particular myths of modernity, 
flexibility, liberties, effectiveness, the ‘systemic relevance’ and usefulness of the super- and 
mega-rich ‘investors’, also, for instance, the superiority per se of ever more research, ever 
more high technology, etc. — in all, strongly caught in ceremonial encapsulation’ rather than 
progressive institutional change, with insufficient collective rationality and action capability. 
 
We will return to progressive institutional change considering its strong preconditions, 
namely the crucial role for public policy to initiate, stabilize, and accelerate it. 
 
 
 
5) An Additional Explanation on How Ceremonial Dominance May Emerge 
From an Instrumental Benchmark 
 
 
5.1) The Different Benchmarks:  The Institution as 'Enabler' vs. Ceremonial 
Dominance 
 
As we have seen, in the GT argument the institution emerges in a complex evolutionary 
process from a defined particular problem-solving process. It helps individuals to solve 
complex decision situations that otherwise would not be solvable in a decentralized 
individualistic economy. 
 
Consistent with this view, it has for long been argued by institutionalists that the institution is 
not just a restriction to some ideal (allegedly unrestrained) perfect maximization, as argued 
by neoclassical economics, and it is not even just flatly past-bound, conservative, and 
inadequate, but in complex situations it also is an ‘enabler’ of qualified, coordinated behavior 
of agents (see, e.g., Neale 1994), an empowerment of agents in terms of improving 
information and making expectations of agents consistent with each other and thus stabilizing 
them — i.e., the instrumental dimension of institutions. 
 
On the other hand, as we have seen, some ceremonial dominance is rooted in the asymmetry 
of the logics of ceremonial vs. instrumental warrants, where ceremonial valuation is more 
‘permeable’, i.e., capable of encapsulating more ways of behavior than instrumental valuation 
is capable of embedding. This very asymmetry was reflected, as seen, in the dominance of 
defective strategies in the GT perspective. 
 
Also, in the institutionalist tradition, the ceremonially warranted institution has mostly been 
the starting point, due to the historical perspective of institutionalism, where more or less 
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predatory societies and economies have been the received object of realistic and 
comprehensive socio-economic analysis and theorizing. 
 
However, both the logical and historical accounts do not fully ‘genetically’ explain how 
ceremonial dominance endogenously emerges, particularly from a benchmark of an 
instrumentally warranted institution. Especially in a GT perspective, we would need to show 
that, and how, initially institutionalized problem-solving cooperation degenerates into a 
ceremonial defection. 
 
Instrumentally warranted institutions can indeed have an endogenous course of their own, 
some life cycle leading them from ‘instrumental’ (considered here the ‘natural state’ of the 
system) to ‘ceremonial’, in fact a process of degeneration, from problem-solving cooperation 
to a behavior that – while perhaps even formally unchanged – in fact has become inadequate 
in face of new conditions, which is equivalent to the idea of (institutional) lock-in as in the 
famous QWERTY analysis (David 1985) — where a new collective-action capability is 
required for a proper progressive institutional change to emerge. Note that such ‘institutional 
lock-in’ usually will happen in a hierarchical environment. 
 
For a normal-form game, think of the case mentioned, that new conditions (new knowledge, 
some technological/organizational progress, and, in addition, now also an uneven distribution 
of the gains of cooperative behavior) change the payoff structure in a way to make the 
formerly (Pareto-) superior common-cooperation solution now (Pareto-) inferior (in a 2x2 
PD). We will give a schematic illustration after the story-telling. 
 
 
5.2) Degeneration of an Instrumentally Warranted Institution 
 
Instrumentally Warranted Cooperation in a Hierarchical Environment 
The idea applies when, for instance, a fresh economics M.A. or MBA joins a firm with new 
ideas and new knowledge, but his suggestions are refused by his superior arguing ‘We have 
always done it like this, we have been successful with this, and we will continue doing it like 
this.’ This would be a symbolic indication of an institution formerly successfully established 
to solve a certain problem, by which a group became a cooperating one, thus successfully 
coordinated and highly performing. With the successfully cooperating group ‘plus hierarchy’, 
however, the group leaders and higher ranks of the cooperating team have established and 
tightened their positions, promoted their individual careers, and perhaps climbed up the 
hierarchical ladder. 
 
The ‘Career Motive’ and the ‘Motive of Identity and Belongingness’ 
Differential hierarchical status and power in societies, economies, and organizations that are 
characterized by received power and status differences anyway, i.e., the ceremonial value, 
thus becomes a new, additional motive determining the future of that institution. But also, the 
very ‘ceremonial’ valuations may also provide institutionalized identity and belongingness to 
the lower ranks of the team, which in turn may relieve their uncertainty in the turbulent 
environment they live in (for an institutional economics of identity, see, e.g., Herrmann-
Pillath 2011). These factors may combine and transform the system into a position of 
unilateral defection and exploitation where the superiors increasingly exploit but still manage 
to keep their subordinates cooperating. 
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Also, habituation may explain why those receiving less of the common gain stick to the same 
formal behavior although the character of the institution has tacitly changed. Consider the 
following illustration in a normal-form matrix: 
 
Starting with the usual PD, 
 
a,a  d,b 
   b,d  c,c ,  with b>a>c>d, 
 
the payoffs of common cooperation and success may change into 
 
   a1,a2  d,b 
   b,d  c,c , 
 
with either (1) b>a1>a2>c>d or even (2) a1>b>a2>c>d, i.e., the earlier common success, but 
with an increasingly uneven distribution now. Agent 2, the subordinate, may still stick to the 
institutionalized behavior (rather than changing back to defection) by way of still receiving 
identity from the ‘winning team’ or just by way of habituation, while agent 1, the superior, in 
the extreme case (case (2)), even has gained a short-run (hyper-rational) incentive to stick to it 
(no sacrifice any longer while sticking to the formally same, earlier cooperative behavior). 
 
The character of the situation then may change from an instrumental warrant into a full-
fledged ceremonial warrant, when (a1,a2) changes into an overtly exploitative situation, (b’,d’) 
(i.e., a1→b’ and a2→d’), perhaps with a further aggravating unequal distribution, in the frame 
of a now new PD: 
 
   a’,a’  d’,b’ 
         (a1,a2)→(b’,d’)  c’,c’ ,  with b’>a’>c’>d’. 
 
The conventional GT prediction for the new PD structure would be the common-defection NE 
in the next step, since the exploited would rationally switch back to defection as well in the 
new game. In any case, the earlier instrumentally warranted situation will have fully 
transformed itself into a ceremonially warranted situation, a situation of a Bc-Vc-Bi type11. 
 
Another ‘Motive’:  Institutional Economies of Scale 
A factor supporting this process of collective cooperative success (how unevenly distributed 
ever) may be transaction-cost reduction, i.e., the economies of scale of the application of that 
institution, with a learning curve that ensures that sticking to the institution makes the average 
transaction costs of the single institutionalized decision ever more decrease — the classical 
case of routinization and, in fact, an objective cost argument in favor of habituation. 
 
That senior manager who is referring to, and insisting upon, his past experience in the 
example above, thus, is of course not totally selfish. He might refer to a history of the 
                                                 
11
 There are certainly different (and more elaborated) ways to capture the ceremonially warranted degenerative 
situation in some future EIGT modeling. For instance, one might also think of a game in which each payoff is a 
vector with the elements of an instrumental and ceremonial payoff. A weight function (‘utility function’) may 
then result in overall ceremonially or instrumentally warranted behavior. Habituation and sticking to an earlier 
instrumentally warranted institution under now ceremonial warrant may then be modeled by a change of 
weights. There are many similar approaches in the literature. Proper modeling of instititutionalist theory in this 
regard, however, is absolutely rare and must be left to future effort. 
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institution that has been successful. During that history, he and his ‘interaction partners’ have 
successfully established the institution as an adequate instrumental device. 
 
But also, as particularly the GT analysis reveals, he and the others in that interaction system in 
fact had to invest a lot in terms of time, intellectual effort, uncertainty, risk-taking of getting 
exploited once, trial & error, non-invidiousness, etc., to make that institution eventually 
emerging in a long and fragile joint learning process, as indicated above. The result was the 
development of an effective instrumentally warranted institution, habituated by all involved. 
 
And, as everyone who has invested high fixed and sunk costs, he and his fellows desire 
permanently high returns on their investment, by spreading their initial fixed costs over as 
many applications as possible (thus maximizing ‘output’, i.e., the quantity of applications). 
And, if possible, they do not wish to invest in a new learning process. They do want their 
initial high investment to be apportioned among a maximum number of applications of the 
same institution, i.e., an endless series of institutionalized/routinized decisions. They want to 
realize increasing returns. The important reason here will be that coordination, in such a 
learning process and with cumulative reinforcement of cooperation, may become ever more 
effective (in a stochastic population perspective:  The portion of cooperative actions in all 
actions will increase) and thus the whole decision process and its performance more effective. 
Decreasing transaction costs of the institution will contribute to the relatively high payoffs of 
common cooperation (further increasing the win-win payoff). 
 
From a Norm Still Instrumentally Warranted … 
Now, this situation may still be consistent with the instrumental character of the institution. 
While the institution may increasingly appear to the individual agents, in the culture of the 
team, group, or organization at hand, as something external, a given, exogenous requirement, 
desideratum, a postulate, or a norm, it still may be dominantly instrumentally warranted and 
relate to the solution of the problem structure at hand. But tacitly, the motivation to maintain 
the institution may change from solving the original problem to (1) saving the careers of the 
leaders and thus extra benefits and unequal distribution (see above), and (2) reducing average 
transaction costs, making their decision-making as easy and smooth as possible, rather than 
properly solving a defined problem, which may have become a new problem in the meantime. 
 
A norm, thus, is not necessarily ceremonially warranted. The instrumentally warranted 
institution may have become a general prescription, and even become codified, but the 
connection to the basic problem has become somewhat opaque, but still may be an adequate 
behavioral pattern. We term this an instrumentally warranted norm. 
 
Note that related behavior, earlier Bi, may easily be considered to have become ‘dialectical’ in 
the institutionalist sense, i.e., Bci, as mentioned above. 
 
… to a Ceremonially Warranted Social Rule and Institution — An Abstract Norm 
Only when some ‘external’ conditions change — in GT modeling:  changing expectations 
and/or payoff structure — the instrumentally warranted norm would turn out to be 
disconnected from the (new) problem. And it would become further disconnected as the 
establishment of a proper new institution will be blocked by the now dominating motives of 
differential status and of continuing easy and smooth decision-making. The formally same 
behavior thus now becomes ceremonially warranted, and in fact defective in terms of the 
payoff structure, while the agents shift from the upper left in the basic PD matrix to the lower 
right of a new PD, which then provides new and larger win-win opportunities in the upper 
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left. We call this an abstract norm. Remember that the ‘norm-ative’ dimension may work as 
an imposition on the subalterns to stick to cooperation, the earlier instrumentally warranted 
institution. 
 
The institutional economies of scale in a complex environment together with the motive of 
differential status and power in a hierarchy thus explain why socio-economic interaction 
systems may stick to an (formerly instrumentally warranted) institution for longer than 
instrumentally justified. The institution may eventually become ‘outdated’, ‘petrified’, 
‘sclerotic’, ‘ossified’, or locked-in. The ceremonial motivation and valuation will prevent the 
interaction system to properly learn, and gain a renewed collective action capability required 
according to the instrumental value criterion. 
 
Note that a new institution may facilitate even lower average decision costs in the long-run. 
The more disconnected from the problem the abstract norm gets, and the more fight over 
unilateral or mutual exploitation may re-emerge, the more the average transaction costs of 
the old norm may increase again. Thus, the potential average transaction costs of a new 
institution may fall below those of the old norm, despite its initial high average and marginal 
costs. This, of course, does not guarantee that the system will regain anew a proper collective 
action capability, as game-theoretic analysis reveals. See Figure 7 for an illustration. 
 
 
Figure 7: Average Transaction Costs and Institutional Economies of Scale Supporting the 
Emergence of a Ceremonially Warranted Norm After Some ‘Technological’ 
Change -- Illustration. 
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In all, this ‘endogenous’ institutional degeneration may help systematically explain the 
ceremonial dimension and its domination in an individualized and hierarchical environment. 
Figure 8 sums up the changing character of an institution during a ‘life-cycle’ as described. 
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Figure 8: The Instrumental and Ceremonial Dimensions of Institutions — From an 
Instrumentally Warranted Institution to an Abstract Norm. 
 
 
 
 
6) The ‘Discretionary Character of Progressive Institutional Change’ 
and a GT-Informed Policy Perspective 
 
 
6.1) The Possibility, and Improbability, of Instrumental Solutions in a Spontaneous 
Decentralized Individualistic System 
 
As progressive institutional change will normally not automatically emerge — particularly 
when systemic crises and conditions of widespread uncertainty and fears may lead to 
reinforced ceremonial encapsulation or even regressive institutional change — it remains an 
issue of proper deliberate, discretionary policy action, as institutionalists have always argued 
(see Bush, pp. 1107-9). In the institutionalist tradition, M.R. Tool further developed the 
theory and philosophy of instrumentalism and progressive institutional change into the social 
value principle, which operationalized the pragmatist institutionalist conception of public 
policy and its formation (see, e.g., Tool 1994, and the references given there). It elaborated 
the issue that democracy and transparent democratic participatory policy is substantial in the 
sense that reasonable decisions on prices, wages, income distribution, etc. will have to be 
determined in a cause-and-effect-based negotiation processes of all social interests involved 
(the so-called ‘negotiated economy’; see already Commons 1934). This is not primarily about 
some abstract ‘majority rule’ but about the substantial 
 
‘process by which majorities […] are formed’ (Bush, p. 1109), 
 
and such process would be heavily interconnected 
 
‘with the process of inquiry upon which instrumental valuing depends’ (ibid.). 
 
In this way, substantial, participative, and discursive democracy would support collective 
long-run rationality and action capacity, and with this an increasing dominance of 
instrumental values and instrumentally warranted patterns of behavior — i.e., progressive 
institutional change. 
 
The ‘non-cooperative’ GT perspective, in contrast, is not so much about discourse and oral 
communication but rather on ‘tacit’ learning from repeated interaction and from the 
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consequences of combined action12. Nevertheless, it suggests a similar conclusion regarding 
the critical role of discretionary public policy action, related to the interaction system of the 
individual agents and the critical factors determining its process and outcomes. In fact, GT 
modeling and related complex model simulations have specifically demonstrated that there is 
no automatic or easy way out of dominant defection, and even of repeated breakdown of some 
institutionalized cooperation after it has emerged in complex settings and long-run 
evolutionary processes (see, e.g., Liebrand, Messick 1996; Lindgren 1997, for classical 
accounts). 
 
Thus, a very basic GT-informed policy conclusion, based on the most simple single-shot 
approach as indicated above, may be the following. We refer to Elsner (2001) and make a 
long story very short here. Remember the simple PD-SG single-shot inequality above. 
Obviously, it is unfavorable for cooperation if (b) and (c) are relatively high and (a) and δ are 
relatively low. The simple algebraic logic of policy action resulting is rather obvious: 
 
δ↑  >  [(b↓ – a↑)↓ / (b↓ – c↓↓)↑]↓. 
 
Note, that the PD payoff structure must not be dissolved as such by policy action, this would 
imply a trivial and probably a politically costly solution (i.e., subsidizing a such that 
eventually a > b). 
 
Thus, the problem that remains, and cannot be solved by hyper-rational individuals coined for 
an ideal ‘market’, is the very social-dilemma structure, i.e., an individualistic culture when, 
however, real-world ‘markets’ are characterized by directly interdependent and directly 
interacting agents (see, e.g., Kirman 1998). An individualistic culture confronted with 
complex and dilemma-prone incentive structures implies that the process of solving a 
‘collective-good’ or a social-dilemma through cooperation will usually be highly time-
consuming and unstable, if not blocked at all. The more individualistic the culture is, i.e., the 
stronger the dilemma-structure in terms of the relations of a, b, c, and δ, the greater is the 
incentive to defect and to deviate from an already established institution of cooperation13. 
Again, we can see a full equivalence with the institutionalist conclusion with respect to 
ceremonial dominance here. 
 
The process of (instrumentally warranted) institutional emergence and the conditions for its 
initiation, its sufficiently fast emergence, and its stability over time has been extensively 
investigated in recent decades, after some pioneering explorations by, e.g., Schelling 1978; 
Schotter 1981; or Axelrod 1984/2006 (among the countless game-theoretic and PD-based 
modeling and simulation approaches, see, e.g., Stanley et al. 1994; Liebrand, Messick (eds.) 
1996; Lindgren 1997; Fudenberg, Levine 1998; Offerman, Sonnemans 1998; Oltra, Schenk 
1998; Eckert, Koch, Mitloehner 2005; Demange, Wooders (eds.) 2005; Traulsen, Novak 
2006; Jun, Sethi 2009; Spiekermann 2009; Hédoin 2010). 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to design a supra-individualistic, i.e., broader and more long-run, 
rational mechanism to support this process and complete the whole system, namely an 
                                                 
12
 This means that we will take the policy agent here as given, informed by a deliberately negotiated economy —
admittedly a ‘catch-all’ entity. Modeling democratic process explicitly with GT would be in the realm of 
‘cooperative’ GT. As a prominent recent example, see, e.g., McCain 2009. 
13
 In a more elaborated population model on the critical size of institutions, we have shown that institutions and 
their carrier groups or ‘platforms’ will become exploited (invaded) by defectors beyond a critical maximum (a 
‘meso’) size when few invaders profit from exploitation of many cooperators — see Elsner, Heinrich 2009. 
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additional public-policy intervention to initiate, accelerate, and stabilize the process, which 
cannot be brought forth with sufficient speed and stability by the ‘market’ or any 
decentralized individualist system alone, if there are ubiquitous dilemma-prone direct 
interdependencies and thus coordination/cooperation problems in the real world ‘out there’. 
 
 
6.2) ‘Meritorics’ For a Negotiated Economy 
 
The conception of the merit good (see, e.g., Brennan, Lomasky 1983; Musgrave 1987) has 
substantiated ‘meritorization’ (i.e., a positive social valuation) exactly on the basis of 
‘community preferences’ that have evolved from interaction processes beyond the ‘market’ 
logic (Musgrave 1987, 452). This implies a social evaluation of the outcomes of the ‘market’ 
through some kind of a social decision-making broader than, relatively independent of, and 
superior to it. 
 
For our purpose we will define a merit good as a good possibly resulting from the 
decentralized evolutionary interaction process of emergence as indicated (a ‘self-organizing’ 
process, and in this sense a ‘private good’ then), which, however, needs to be evaluated 
through a social decision-making process on the grounds of its deficient quantity, quality, and 
— as new dimensions discovered in deficient ‘market’ processes with coordination and 
cooperation problems — the certainty of its emergence, the time needed for its production, 
and the stability of its acquisition through a decentralized system and process (see also, e.g., 
Ver Eecke 1998). 
 
Institutionalists have always claimed that democratic and participative socio-political 
decision-making should continue to be relatively independent of the ‘market’ allocation and 
should have priority over it (see, e.g., Hayden 1994). The institutionalist conception of the 
negotiated economy was exactly elaborated to show that the ‘market’ has to be deliberately 
embedded in a wider socio-political process, and how this is possible (see again Commons 
1934, 612ff., 649ff.; also, e.g., Ramstad 1991; Nielsen 1992). 
 
We will not delve into this discussion any deeper here, but will simply assume an economic 
policy agent who is legitimized through a process of participatory democratic decision-
making, subject to the criteria of the pragmatist ‘instrumental value principle’. In this very 
process, public policy objectives can be developed which provide the criteria for the 
‘meritorization’ required. Note that not necessarily a financially ‘big’ state but a self-
conscious and in this sense ‘strong’ democratic state would be required. 
 
Against this background, the economic policy agent may employ instruments related to the 
interactive process of the private agents to change those interactions, aiming at initiating, 
accelerating, and stabilizing the provision of the merit good through promoting cooperation. 
 
 
6.3) Instruments of an ‘Interactive’ or ‘Institutional’ Economic Policy 
 
Not only does the public policy agent have to publicly identify the specific characteristics of 
the ‘good’ he/she wants the private agents to cooperatively produce (equivalent to the ‘Pareto-
superior’ economic situation as illustrated in EIGT), i.e., the public objective or ‘merit good’, 
but he must also establish incentives to promote cooperative private behavior that favors this 
superior social solution. For instance, he may implicate the private agents into projects to be 
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pursued cooperatively, which helps (1) increasing their awareness of their complex and 
dilemma-prone interdependence (for this, see, e.g., Bush 1999), (2) increasing their 
awareness of the fact that they always will have a common future to meet again (a high δ) 
(and then either reward each other for previous cooperation or continue sanctioning and 
‘warfare’ for earlier defection), and (3) enabling them to learn to cooperate. 
 
Rewarding Cooperation 
The first complex of instruments of ‘interactive (or institutional) economic policy’ is rather 
obvious; it aims at changing the incentives (the payoffs in the technical sense) in order to 
increase the relative rewards for cooperation (a↑) or the opportunity costs of common 
defection (b↓ - c↓↓)↑, or decrease the opportunity costs of common cooperation (b↓ - a↑)↓. See 
the simple logic of policy actions attached to the single-shot inequality above. 
 
The single-shot inequality also shows that the more successful the public agent is in 
integrating the private agents into a future-bound process, i.e., the higher the discount 
parameter δ, the less the increase of the relative rewards for cooperation need to be. 
 
However, this trade-off between the rewards for cooperation (a) and the ‘shadow of the 
common future’ (Axelrod), δ, does not necessarily imply a contrast between quantitative 
(namely, pecuniary) and qualitative instruments, i.e., offering pecuniary subsidies as opposed 
to promoting more favorable expectations among the agents (of ‘meeting again’). As has been 
shown from long lasting practical experience, the incentives from the public policy agent 
which reward cooperation may even primarily consist of non-pecuniary benefits (for instance, 
early information about public planning, see again Elsner 2001). 
 
Enlarging the ‘Shadow of the Future’ 
The second complex of instruments of interactive economic policy is not that obvious, in 
practical terms. It refers to the analytics of the basic interactive process, i.e., the logic and 
probability of ‘meeting again’ (the same agent in a future interaction)14. Consistent with the 
single-shot solution, cooperation can be promoted if the discount parameter can be increased, 
i.e., if future interactions become more probable or future-awareness of the agents can be 
promoted. 
 
But this condition for the success of the basic evolutionary process can also be subject to 
policy control. As Axelrod (1984/2006) has already mentioned, the public agent can indeed 
increase the importance (i.e., the probability, or weight) of future interactions ‘with the same’ 
by organizing cooperation in the form of frequent project-based meetings, or make it 
permanent, e.g., by organizing meetings with a greater frequency, dividing projects into 
several sub-interactions, connecting different projects so that the same agents will meet in 
different arenas, connecting them over time, etc. Obviously, there is ample opportunity for the 
public agent to deliberately design the conditions of interaction to promote cooperation in a 
variety of subject areas that private agents are jointly interested in, namely, in order to 
improve common conditions (location factors) of their individual economic activities 
(infrastructures, intermediary agencies, or improving the industrial structure itself by 
strengthening individual agents involved). 
 
                                                 
14
 Note that the introduction of reputation mechanisms and chains in more complex population models helps 
considerably extending the number and range of agents falling under this criterion (see, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 
2009). 
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This policy perspective can be, and has been, applied to manifold areas of industrial and 
regional policies, cluster and network policies, innovation and information policies (see, e.g., 
Elsner 2000, 2001). Also, it has been demonstrated to be a ‘lean’, ‘qualitative’, ‘structural’, 
and thus inexpensive policy (it definitely is not about subsidizing cooperation so that a > b). 
 
It is institutional policy since it refers to the processes of institutional emergence, and it is 
‘double interactive’ as it refers in an interactive way to the conditions and intermediate results 
of the interaction processes of the private agents. 
 
Finally, it has been shown to be applicable by ‘enlightened’ interdependent and interacting 
agents themselves, as their own policy strategy, e.g., in their cluster, their value-added chain, 
their innovation network, etc., or by an ‘enlightened’ neutral private cluster or network 
advisor hired by the parties involved. As far as this has its inherent limits, the public agent’s 
state activity, a new type of ‘enlightened’ public agency, to be sure, is required. 
 
The evolutionary-institutionalist interpretation of the GT perspective obviously largely and 
‘naturally’ converges with the policy perspectives institutionalism has developed over 
decades. 
 
 
 
7) A Short Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, an effort was made to 
 
- revisit the institutionalist theory of institutional change, the VAFB-paradigm, as 
formulated by P.D. Bush, after (roughly) 25 years; 
 
- reconsider the logic of its conception of institutions and institutional value-
behavior-structures; 
 
- elaborate surprising equivalences, similarities and complementarities of an EIGT 
perspective, if embedded in a proper evolutionary perspective and ‘process story’, 
with the institutionalist approach, as demonstrated in the cases of (1) the 
conception of institutions, (2) value-warranted institutional structures, (3) the 
basic asymmetry between instrumental and ceremonial warrant, (4) the rationale 
of the concept of ceremonial dominance, and (5) the different resulting forms of 
value-behavior-structures and their potential endogenous dynamics, i.e. 
institutional change; 
 
- elaborate some relative advantages and disadvantages of each perspective, as for 
instance 
 
(1) the advantage of the institutionalist approach, based on its larger 
epistemological foundations, towards the specification of the different value-
behavior structures, based on a clear conception of the instrumental-vs.-ceremonial 
asymmetry, of the dynamics of ceremonial encapsulation, and of progressive and 
regressive institutional change; 
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(2) the clearer distinction in the GT perspective between institutions and simpler 
social rules (with a complementary asymmetry), based on its greater potential of a 
logical analysis of the processes of institutional emergence, furthermore its logical 
requirement to endogenously explain the emergence and dominance of the 
ceremonial warrant as instrumentally warranted institutions degenerate into 
‘abstract norms’; 
 
- parallel the inescapable discretionary policy perspectives in both approaches, 
where already the most simple formal solution shows that a proper GT argument 
can contribute some specific implications for policy instruments, which, however, 
may well fit into the broader institutionalist conceptions of the social value 
principle and the negotiated economy. 
 
In all, a modern revisiting, interpretation, and enrichment of the 25-years old state of the art of 
the institutionalist theory of institutional change is possible in a dialectical approaching and 
bridging final gaps — with, in all, more complementarities, synergies, and cross-fertilization 
than incommensurabilities or paradigmatic differences. 
 
It appears that such a review bears some potential, and the institutionalist conceptions of 
institutions and evolutionary institutional change may profit from insights based on proper use 
of EIGT — but also, and perhaps even more so, the EIGT approach may considerably be 
informed from encountering the rich tradition of the VAFB-paradigm. 
 
If this mutual approaching, bridge-building and gap-closing between modern formal 
approaches and evolutionary institutionalism becomes a major line research in the future, 
Institutionalism may cross some boundaries that have limited its reach for long. 
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